Secure and reliable connectivity in heterogeneous wireless sensor
  networks by Eletreby, Rashad & Yağan, Osman
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
02
46
6v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 24
 O
ct 
20
16
Secure and reliable connectivity in heterogeneous
wireless sensor networks
Rashad Eletreby and Osman Yag˘an
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and CyLab,
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213 USA
reletreby@cmu.edu, oyagan@ece.cmu.edu
Abstract—We consider wireless sensor networks secured by
the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme under an
on/off channel model. The heterogeneous random key predis-
tribution scheme considers the case when the network includes
sensor nodes with varying levels of resources, features, or con-
nectivity requirements; e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster heads, but
does not incorporate the fact that wireless channel are unreliable.
To capture the unreliability of the wireless medium, we use an
on/off channel model; wherein, each wireless channel is either on
(with probability α) or off (with probability 1−α) independently.
We present conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how to
scale the parameters of the network model so that with high
probability the network is k-connected, i.e., the network remains
connected even if any k − 1 nodes fail or leave the network. We
also present numerical results to support these conditions in the
finite-node regime.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks, Security, Inhomoge-
neous Random Key Graphs, k-connectivity.
1. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Background
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) comprise of wireless-
capable sensor nodes that are typically deployed randomly
in large scale to meet application-specific requirements. They
facilitate a broad range of applications including military,
health, and environmental monitoring, among others [1]. Due
to the nature of those applications, a battery-powered sensor
node is typically required to operate for a long period of time
and such a stringent requirement on battery life severely limits
the communication and computation abilities of WSNs. For
instance, traditional security schemes that require high over-
head are not feasible for such resource-constrained networks.
However, WSNs are usually deployed in hostile environments
and left unattended, thus they should be equipped with security
mechanisms to defend against attacks such as node capture,
eavesdropping, etc. Random key predistribution schemes were
proposed to tackle those limitations, and they are currently
regarded as the most feasible solutions for securing WSNs;
e.g., see [2, Chapter 13] and [3], and references therein.
Random key predistribution schemes were first introduced
in the seminal work of Eschenauer and Gligor [4]. Their
scheme, that we refer to as the EG scheme, operates as follows:
before deployment, each sensor node is assigned a random
set of K cryptographic keys, selected uniformly at random
and without replacement from a key pool of size P . After
deployment, two nodes can communicate securely over an
existing channel if they share at least one key. The EG scheme
led the way to several other variants, including the q-composite
scheme, the random pairwise scheme [5], and many others.
Recently, Yag˘an [6] introduced a new variation of the
EG scheme, referred to as the heterogeneous key predistri-
bution scheme. The heterogeneous scheme generalizes the
EG scheme by considering the case when the network in-
cludes sensor nodes with varying levels of resources, features,
or connectivity requirements (e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster
heads); a situation that is likely to hold in many real-world
implementations of WSNs [7]. The scheme is described as
follows. Given r classes, each node is independently classified
as a class-i node with probability µi > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , r.
Then, class-i sensors are each assigned Ki keys selected
uniformly at random from a key pool of size P . Similar to the
EG scheme, nodes that share key(s) can communicate securely
over an available channel after the deployment; see Section 2
for details.
Since then, the work on the heterogeneous scheme has
been extended in several directions by the authors; e.g.,
see [8]–[11]. In particular, the reliability of secure WSNs
under the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme has been
studied in [8]. There we obtained the probability of the
WSN remaining securely connected even when each wireless
link fails with probability 1 − α independently from others.
This is equivalent to studying the secure connectivity of a
WSN under an on/off channel model, wherein each wireless
channel is on with probability α and off with probability
1 − α independently from other channels. Authors showed
that network reliability exhibits a threshold phenomena and
established critical conditions on the probability distribution
µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr}, and for the scalings (as a function of
network size n) of the key ring sizes K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr},
the key pool size P , and the channel parameter α so that the
resulting WSN is securely 1-connected with high probability.
Although these results form a crucial starting point towards
the analysis of the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme,
the connectivity results given in [8] do not guarantee that the
network would remain connected when sensors fail due to
battery depletion, get captured by an adversary, or when they
are mobile (leading to a change in their channel probabilities).
Therefore, sharper results that guarantee network connectivity
in the aforementioned scenarios are needed.
B. Contributions
The objective of our paper is to address the limitations of the
results in [8]. In particular, we consider the heterogeneous key
predistribution scheme under an on/off communication model
consisting of independent wireless channels each of which is
either on (with probability α), or off (with probability 1−α).
We derive conditions on the network parameters so that the
network is k-connected with high probability as the number
of nodes gets large. The k-connectivity property guarantees
network connectivity despite the failure of any k−1 nodes (or,
links) [12]. We remark that our results are also of significant
importance to mobile WSNs, since for a k-connected mobile
WSN, any (k−1) nodes are free to move anywhere while the
rest of the network remains at least 1-connected.
Our approach is based on modeling the WSN by an appro-
priate random graph and then establishing scaling conditions
on the model parameters such that it is k-connectivity with
high probability as the number of nodes n gets large. We
remark that the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme
induces an inhomogeneous random key graph [6], denoted
by K(n,µ,K, P ), while the on-off communication model
induces a standard Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph [13], denoted by
G(n, α). The overall network can therefore be modeled by the
intersection of an inhomogeneous random key graph with an
ER graph, denoted K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ G(n;α). Put differently,
the edges in K(n;µ,K, P )∩G(n;α) represent pairs of sensors
that share a key and have an available wireless channel in
between; i.e., those that can communicate securely in one hop.
We present conditions on how to scale the parameters of the
intersection graph K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ G(n;α) so that it is k-
connected with high probability when the number of nodes n
gets large.
C. Notation and Conventions
All limiting statements, including asymptotic equivalences
are considered with the number of sensor nodes n going to
infinity. The random variables (rvs) under consideration are all
defined on the same probability triple (Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic
statements are made with respect to this probability measure
P, and we denote the corresponding expectation by E. We
say that an event holds with high probability (whp) if it holds
with probability 1 as n → ∞. In comparing the asymptotic
behaviors of the sequences {an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn),
an = w(bn), an = O(bn), an = Ω(bn), and an = Θ(bn),
with their meaning in the standard Landau notation.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a network consisting of n sensor nodes labeled
as v1, v2, . . . , vn. Each sensor node is classified as one of
the r possible classes according to a probability distribution
µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , r and∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Before deployment, each class-i node selects
Ki cryptographic keys uniformly at random from a key pool
of size P . Clearly, the key ring Σx of node vx is a PKtx -
valued rv where PKtx denotes the collection of all subsets
of {1, . . . , P} with exactly Ktx elements and tx denotes the
class of node vx. The rvs Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σn are then i.i.d. with
P[Σx = S | tx = i] =
(
P
Ki
)
−1
, S ∈ PKi .
After deployment, two sensor nodes that share at lease one
cryptographic key in common can communicate securely over
an existing communication channel.
Throughout, we let K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr}, and assume
without loss of generality that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr.
Consider a random graph K induced on the vertex set V =
{v1, . . . , vn} such that two distinct nodes vx and vy are
adjacent in K, denoted by the event Kxy, if they have at least
one cryptographic key in common, i.e.,
Kxy := [Σx ∩ Σy 6= ∅] . (1)
The adjacency condition (1) describes the inhomogeneous
random key graph K(n;µ,K, P ) that has been introduced in
[6]. This model is also known in the literature as the general
random intersection graph; e.g., see [14]–[16].
The inhomogeneous random key graph models the secure
connectivity of the underlying WSN. In particular, the prob-
ability pij that a class-i node and a class-j have a common
key, and thus are adjacent in K(n;µ,K, P ), is given by
pij = P[Kxy] = 1−
(
P −Ki
Kj
)/(
P
Kj
)
(2)
as long as Ki + Kj ≤ P ; otherwise if Ki + Kj > P , we
clearly have pij = 1. We also define the mean probability λi
of edge occurrence for a class-i node in K(n;µ,K, P ). With
arbitrary nodes vx and vy , we have
λi =
r∑
j=1
pijµj , i = 1, . . . , r, (3)
as we condition on the class of node vy .
The preceding notion of secure connectivity between two
nodes does not incorporate the fact that wireless channels are
unreliable. In particular, two nodes sharing a cryptographic
key are not necessarily able to communicate with one another
because of the unreliability of the wireless channel. In this
work, we consider the communication topology of the WSN
as consisting of independent channels that are either on (with
probability α) or off (with probability 1 − α). In particular,
let {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote i.i.d Bernoulli rvs,
each with success probability α. The communication channel
between two distinct nodes vx and vy is on (respectively, off)
if Bxy(α) = 1 (respectively if Bxy(α) = 0). Although the
on-off channel model could be deemed too simple, it captures
the unreliability of wireless links and enables a comprehensive
analysis of the properties of interest of the resulting WSN,
e.g., its connectivity. It was also shown that on/off channel
model provides a good approximation of the more realistic
disk model [17] in many similar settings and for similar
properties of interest; e.g., see [18]–[20]. The on/off channel
model induces a standard Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph G(n;α)
[21], defined on the vertices V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that vx
and vy are adjacent, denoted Cxy , if Bxy(α) = 1.
We model the overall topology of a WSN by the intersection
of an inhomogeneous random key graph K(n;µ,K, P ) and
an ER graph G(n;α). Namely, nodes vx and vy are adjacent
in K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ G(n;α), denoted Exy , if and only if
they are adjacent in both K and G. In other words, edges
in the intersection graph K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ G(n;α) represent
pairs of sensors that can securely communicate as they have
i) a communication link in between that is on, and ii) a
shared cryptographic key. Therefore, studying the connectivity
properties of K(n;µ,K, P )∩G(n;α) amounts to studying the
secure connectivity of heterogeneous WSNs under the on/off
channel model.
Throughout, we denote the intersection graph
K(n;µ,K, P )∩G(n;α) by H(n;µ,K, P, α). To simplify the
notation, we let θ = (K,P ), and Θ = (θ, α). The probability
of edge existence between a class-i node vx and a class-j
node vy in H(n;Θ) is given by
P[Exy
∣∣∣ tx = i, ty = j] = P[Kxy∩Cxy | tx = i, ty = j] = αpij
by independence. Similar to (3), the mean edge probability for
a class-i node in H(n;µ,Θ) as Λi is given by
Λi =
r∑
j=1
µjαpij = αλi, i = 1, . . . , r. (4)
From now on, we assume that the number of classes r is
fixed and does not scale with n, and so are the probabilities
µ1, . . . , µr. All of the remaining parameters are assumed to
be scaled with n.
3. MAIN RESULT AND DISCUSSION
A. Result
We refer to a mapping K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 as a
scaling (for the inhomogeneous random key graph) as long as
the conditions
2 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ . . . ≤ Kr,n ≤ Pn/2 (5)
are satisfied for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Similarly any mapping α :
N0 → (0, 1) defines a scaling for the ER graphs. As a result,
a mapping Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1) defines a scaling for the
intersection graph H(n;µ,Θn) given that condition (5) holds.
We remark that under (5), the edge probabilities pij will be
given by (2).
We now present a zero-one law for the k-connectivity of
H(n;µ,Θ).
Theorem 3.1. Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling
Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1). Let the sequence γ : N0 → R be
defined through
Λ1(n) = αnλ1(n) =
logn+ (k − 1) log logn+ γn
n
, (6)
for each n = 1, 2, . . ..
(a) If λ1(n) = o(1), we have
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;µ,Θn) is k-connected] = 0 if lim
n→∞
γn = −∞
(b) If
Pn = Ω(n), (7)
Kr,n
Pn
= o(1), (8)
Kr,n
K1,n
= o(log n), (9)
we have
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;µ,Θn) is k-connected] = 1 if lim
n→∞
γn =∞.
(10)
Put differently, Theorem 3.1 states that H(n;µ,Θn) is k-
connected whp if the mean degree of class-1 nodes, i.e.,
nΛ1(n), is scaled as (logn+ (k − 1) log logn+ γn) for some
sequence γn satisfying limn→∞ γn = ∞. On the other
hand, if the sequence γn satisfies limn→∞ γn = −∞, then
whp H(n;µ,Θn) is not k-connected. This shows that the
critical scaling for H(n;µ,Θn) to be k-connected is given by
Λ1(n) =
logn+(k−1) log logn
n , with the sequence γn : N0 → R
measuring the deviation of Λ1(n) from the critical scaling.
Under an additional condition; namely, λ1(n) = o(1), the
scaling condition (6) can be given by [6, Lemma 4.2]
λ1(n) ∼ K1,nKavg,n
Pn
(11)
where Kavg,n =
∑r
j=1 µjKj,n denotes the mean key ring size
in the network. This shows that the minimum key ring size
K1,n is of significant importance in controlling the connec-
tivity and reliability of the WSN; as explained previously, it
then also controls the number of mobile sensors that can be
accommodated in the network. For example, with the mean
number Kavg,n of keys per sensor is fixed, we see that reducing
K1,n by half means that the smallest αn (that gives the largest
link failure probability 1−αn) for which the network remains
k-connected whp is increased by two-fold for any given k;
e.g., see Figure 3 for a numerical example demonstrating this.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is lengthy and technically in-
volved. Therefore, we omit the details in this conference
version. All details can be found in [22]
B. Comments on the additional technical conditions
In establishing the zero-law of Theorem 3.1, it is required
that λ1(n) = o(1). This condition is enforced mainly for tech-
nical reasons for the proof of the zero-law to work. A similar
condition was also required in [23, Thm 1] for establishing
the zero-law for k-connectivity in the homogeneous random
key graph [24] intersecting ER graph. As a result of (11), this
condition is equivalent to
K1,nKavg,n = o(Pn). (12)
We remark that, in real-world WSN applications the key pool
size Pn is in orders of magnitude larger than any key ring size
in the network [4], [25]. This is needed to ensure the resilience
of the network against adversarial attacks. Concluding, (12)
(and thus λ1(n) = o(1)) is indeed likely to hold in most
applications.
Next, we consider conditions (7), (8), and (9) that are needed
in establishing the one-law of Theorem 3.1. Conditions (7)
and (8) are also needed in real-world WSN implementations
in order to ensure the resilience of the network against node
capture attacks; e.g., see [4], [25]. For example, assume that
an adversary captures a number of sensors, compromising all
the keys that belong to the captured nodes. If Pn = O(Kr,n)
contrary to (8), then the adversary would be able to compro-
mise a positive fraction of the key pool (i.e., Ω(Pn) keys) by
capturing only a constant number of sensors that are of type
r. Similarly, if Pn = o(n), contrary to (7), then again it would
be possible for the adversary to compromise Ω(Pn) keys by
capturing only o(n) sensors (whose type does not matter in
this case). In both cases, the WSN would fail to exhibit the
unassailability property [26], [27] and would be deemed as
vulnerable against adversarial attacks. We remark that both
(7) and (8) were required in [6], [23] for obtaining the one-
law for connectivity and k-connectivity, respectively, in similar
settings to ours.
Finally, the condition (9) is enforced mainly for technical
reasons and limits the flexibility of assigning very small key
rings to a certain fraction of sensors when k-connectivity is
considered. An equivalent condition was also needed in [6] for
establishing the one-law for connectivity in inhomogeneous
random key graphs. We refer the reader to [6, Section 3.2] for
an extended discussion on the feasibility of (9) for real-world
WSN implementations, as well as possible ways to replace it
with milder conditions.
We conclude by providing a concrete example that demon-
strates how all the conditions required by Theorem 3.1 can
be met in a real-world implementation. Consider any num-
ber r of sensor types, and pick any probability distribution
µ = {µ1, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , r. For any
channel probability αn = Ω( lognn ), set Pn = n logn and use
K1,n =
(log n)1/2+ε√
αn
and Kr,n =
(1 + ε)(logn)3/2−ε
µr
√
αn
with any ε > 0. Other key ring sizes K1,n ≤
K2,n, . . . ,Kr−1,n ≤ Kr,n can be picked arbitrarily. In view
of Theorem 3.1 and the fact [6, Lemma 4.2] that λ1(n) ∼
K1,nKavg,n
Pn
, the resulting network will be k-connected whp for
any k = 1, 2, . . .. Of course, there are many other parameter
scalings that one can choose.
C. Comparison with related work
Our paper completes the analysis that we started in [9] con-
cerning the minimum node degree of the intersection model
H(n;µ,Θ). There, we presented conditions on how to scale
the parameters of the intersection model H(n;µ,Θ) so that the
minimum node degree is no less than k, with high probability
when the number of nodes n gets large. It is clear that a graph
can not be k-connected if its minimum node degree is less than
k. Thus, we readily obtain the zero-law of Theorem 3.1 by
virtue of the zero-law of the minimum node degree being no
less than k [9, Theorem 3.1]. Our paper completes the analysis
of [9] by means of establishing the one-law of k-connectivity;
thus, obtaining a fuller understanding of the properties of the
intersection model H(n;µ,Θ). In particular, it was conjectured
in [9, Conjecture 3.2], that under some additional conditions,
the zero-one laws for k-connectivity would resemble those for
the minimum node degree being no less than k. In our paper,
we prove that this conjecture is correct and provide the extra
conditions needed for it to hold.
Our results also extend the work by Zhao et al. [23] on
the homogeneous random key graph intersecting ER graph
to the heterogeneous setting. There, a zero-one law for the
property that the graph is k-connected was established for
H(n,K, P, α). Considering Theorem 3.1 and setting r = 1,
i.e., when all nodes belong to the same class and thus receive
the same number K of keys, our results recover Theorem 2
of Zhao et al. (See [23, Theorems 2]).
In [6], Yag˘an established a zero-one law for 1-connectivity
for the inhomogeneous random key graph K(n,µ,K, P ) under
full visibility; i.e., when all pairs of nodes have a reliable
communication channel in between. Our paper extends these
results by considering more practical WSN scenarios where
the unreliability of wireless communication channels are taken
into account through the on/off channel model. Also, we
investigate the k-connectivity of the network for any non-
negative constant integer k; i.e., by setting k = 1 and αn = 1
for each n = 2, 3, . . ., we recover Theorem 2 in [6].
Finally, our work improves upon the results by Zhao et al.
[14] who established zero-one laws for the k-connectivity of
inhomogeneous random key graphs (therein, this model was
referred to as the general random intersection graph). Indeed,
by setting αn = 1 for each n = 2, 3, . . ., our result recovers the
results in [14]. We also remark that the additional conditions
required by main results of [14] render them inapplicable in
practical WSN implementations. This issue is explained in
details in [6, Section 3.3].
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to support
Theorem 3.1 in the finite node regime. In all experiments,
we fix the number of nodes at n = 500 and the size of the
key pool at P = 10, 000. To help better visualize the results,
we use the curve fitting tool of MATLAB.
In Figure 1, we consider the channel parameters α = 0.2,
α = 0.4, α = 0.6, and α = 0.8, while varying the parameter
K1, i.e., the smallest key ring size, from 5 to 40. The number
of classes is fixed to 2, with µ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value of
K1, we set K2 = K1 + 10. For each parameter pair (K,α),
we generate 200 independent samples of the graph H(n;µ,Θ)
and count the number of times (out of a possible 200) that the
obtained graphs are 2-connected. Dividing the counts by 200,
we obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the event of interest.
In Figure 1 as well as the ones that follow we show the
critical threshold of connectivity “predicted” by Theorem 3.1
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Fig. 1. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,θ, α) is 2-connected as a function
of K for α = 0.2, α = 0.4, α = 0.6, α = 0.8 with n = 500 and P =
104; in each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by averaging
over 200 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand for the critical threshold of
connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.1.
by a vertical dashed line. More specifically, the vertical dashed
lines stand for the minimum integer value of K1 that satisfies
λ1(n)=
2∑
j=1
µj
(
1−
(
P−Kj
K1
)
(
P
K1
)
)
>
1
α
logn+ (k − 1) log logn
n
(13)
with any given k and α. We see from Figure 1 that the
probability of k-connectivity transitions from zero to one
within relatively small variations in K1. Moreover, the critical
values of K1 obtained by (13) lie within the transition interval.
In Figure 2, we consider four different values for k, namely
we set k = 4, k = 6, k = 8, and k = 10 while varying K1
from 15 to 40 and fixing α to 0.4. The number of classes
is fixed to 2 with µ = {0.5, 0.5} and we set K2 = K1 + 10
for each value of K1. Using the same procedure that produced
Figure 1, we obtain the empirical probability that H(n;µ,θ, α)
is k-connected versus K1. The critical threshold of connectiv-
ity asserted by Theorem 3.1 is shown by a vertical dashed
line in each curve. Again, we see that numerical results are in
parallel with Theorem 3.1.
Figure 3 is generated in a similar manner with Figure 1,
this time with an eye towards understanding the impact of the
minimum key ring size K1 on network connectivity. To that
end, we fix the number of classes at 2 with µ = {0.5, 0.5} and
consider four different key ring sizes K each with mean 40;
we consider K = {10, 70},K = {20, 60},K = {30, 50}, and
K = {40, 40}. We compare the probability of 2-connectivity
in the resulting networks while varying α from zero to one.
We see that although the average number of keys per sensor is
kept constant in all four cases, network connectivity improves
dramatically as the minimum key ring size K1 increases; e.g.,
with α = 0.2, the probability of connectivity is one when
K1 = K2 = 40 while it drops to zero if we set K1 = 10
while increasing K2 to 70 so that the mean key ring size is
still 40.
Finally, we examine the reliability of H(n;µ,θ, α) by
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,θ, α) is k-connected as a function
of K1 for k = 4, k = 6, k = 8, and k = 10, with n = 500 and P =
104; in each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by averaging
over 200 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand for the critical threshold of
connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.1.
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Fig. 3. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,θ, α) is 2-connected with n =
500, µ = (1/2, 1/2), and P = 104 ; we consider four choices of K =
(K1, K2) each with the same mean.
looking at the probability of 1-connectivity as the number
of deleted (i.e., failed) nodes increases. From a mobility
perspective, this is equivalent to investigating the probability
of a WSN remaining connected as the number of mobile
sensors leaving the network increases. In Figure 4, we set
n = 500,µ = {1/2, 1/2}, α = 0.4, P = 104, and select K1
and K2 = K1 +10 from (13) for k = 8, k = 10, k = 12, and
k = 14. With these settings, we would expect (for very large
n) the network to remain connected whp after the deletion of
up to 7, 9, 11, and 13 nodes, respectively. Using the same
procedure that produced Figure 1, we obtain the empirical
probability that H(n;µ,θ, α) is connected as a function of the
number of deleted nodes1 in each case. We see that even with
1We choose the nodes to be deleted from the minimum vertex cut of H,
defined as the minimum cardinality set whose removal renders it disconnected.
This captures the worst-case nature of the k-connectivity property in a
computationally efficient manner (as compared to searching over all k-sized
subsets and deleting the one that gives maximum damage).
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Fig. 4. Empirical probability that H(n;µ,θ, α) remains connected after
deleting nodes from the minimum vertex cut set. We fix n = 500, µ =
(1/2, 1/2), α = 0.4, P = 104, and choose K1 and K2 = K1 + 10 from
(13) for each k = 8, k = 10, k = 12, and k = 14; i.e., we use K1 =
30, 33, 36, 38, respectively.
n = 500 nodes, the resulting reliability is close to the levels
expected to be attained asymptotically as n goes to infinity. In
particular, we see that the probability of remaining connected
when (k − 1) nodes leave the network is around 0.75 for the
first two cases and around 0.90 for the other two cases.
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